CCD/PV.465
16 April 1970
ENGLISH

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 16 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. R. CARACCIOLO (Italy)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
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Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
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Czechoslovakia:	Mr. M. VEJVODA
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Mexico:	Mr. M. TELLO
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Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (interpretation from French): I declare open the 465th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

2. Before calling upon the first speaker on my list, I believe I am speaking for all members of the Committee in assuring the delegation of the United States of America that we all share the feelings of all the American people today and that we are following with the same anxiety the vicissitudes of the drama now going on in space. We admire the courage, the skill and the sang-froid of the three American astronauts, as well as the tremendous recovery organization which has been set up by the Houston Space Centre. We should like to express our good wishes, and we pray that the three astronauts will return to earth safe and sound.

3. I believe that I shall also be reflecting the feelings of the members of the Committee, as negotiations begin today in Vienna between the delegations of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, in expressing our wishes for the success of those negotiations. All who have spoken in this Committee have expressed their interest in those negotiations and we hope that, in so far as it is possible, the Committee will be kept informed of the outcome of the negotiations as well as of the way in which they develop.

4. Mr. KÖMIVES (Hungary): May I first of all, Mr. Chairman, express my thanks to the delegation of Poland for the fact that at the last meeting Mr. Winiewicz, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Poland, came here and stated so eloquently the reasons which had motivated the submission of the working paper (CCD/285) which the Mongolian and Polish delegations, together with the Hungarian delegation, have co-sponsored. In taking that initiative Hungary is following the way on which it embarked and continuing the efforts which it started at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly when it proposed resolution 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185), which received the support of the overwhelming majority of member States. As is well known to members of the Committee, my Government was one of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution submitted by nine socialist countries at the last session of the General Assembly (A/7655).

5. Although I have very little to add to what has already been said by the other two co-sponsors and by the delegation of the Soviet Union during our last meeting (CCD/PV.464), the Hungarian delegation, too, would like to make some observations on the exchange of views which has taken place on the question on which our attention is now focused -- that is, the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons. The working paper, which takes into account many of the proposals

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

and remarks made in connexion with the draft convention of the nine socialist countries, improves and further strengthens its provisions. It is the opinion of my delegation that the working paper will promote the final elaboration of the draft convention.

6. On the basis of the discussion on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and biological weapons at the last session of the General Assembly and of the careful study of the exchange of views which has taken place so far, it may be concluded that the overwhelming majority of States favour the complete prohibition and destruction of such weapons. This is natural and understandable because this approach is in full conformity with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) and with the conclusions arrived at in the Secretary-General's report (A/7575/Rev.1).

7. At the same time, it can be said also that delegations which oppose the preparation and conclusion of a comprehensive international instrument and which advocate the prohibition of biological weapons only are trying, in our opinion, on the pretext of scientific and technical complexity and details, to avoid giving a clear reply to the question: do they really intend to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and to destroy the existing stockpiles of such weapons?

8. I should not like to be misunderstood by my colleagues. We too are aware of the importance of exploring and clarifying scientific and technical details; we should not like to overlook or ignore them either. However, we must concentrate on the main objective which can be clearly and simply defined: to eliminate chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from military arsenals. My delegation is of the opinion — also expressed by many other delegations — that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles is, not primarily a scientific-technical problem but a political one. We should therefore consider it first of all in its political aspect.

9. As my colleagues may recall, in the course of our discussion we have heard the thesis that a complete prohibition covering both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should not be implemented until a generally-acceptable system and method of verification have been worked out. Many delegations have expressed their views concerning the complexity and difficulty of verification but only a few of them have reached a conclusion in favour of banning the production and possession of biological weapons only. We are fully aware that the working out and functioning of

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

the system and method of verification are inseparable features of any disarmament measure. They should not, however, be the precondition of such measures, particularly if they are extremely complicated and practically incapable of being carried out perfectly.

10. Verification of the observance of such obligations being so difficult and complicated, the co-sponsors of the working paper have sought a system involving the participation of a responsible international organ which could undertake all necessary measures against any would-be violator of the provisions of the convention. This has led the co-sponsors of the working paper to turn to the Security Council, and they were inspired by the verification formula in the United Kingdom draft convention (ENDC/255/Rev.1).

11. Under the provisions of the United Nations Charter the Security Council and its permanent members have been given special rights, and at the same time bear the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Consequently the complaints procedure under an international convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons must necessarily be connected with the Security Council. Regarding the lodging of complaints with the Security Council, in the opinion of my delegation the Security Council could request those international specialized agencies which possess the necessary technical know-how and experience to take part in the complaints procedure. That is why the Hungarian delegation believes that the suggestions made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at our meeting on 9 April (CCD/PV.463, para. 3 et seq.) deserve careful consideration. My delegation, as one of the co-sponsors of the working paper contained in document CCD/285, would like to express its hope that this initiative will help our Committee to reach agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction.

12. On behalf of my delegation I want to join those delegations which have expressed to the delegation of the United States their sentiments concerning the unexpected difficulties of the Apollo 13 mission. We are following with admiration the heroic fight of the brave astronauts and we wish them a safe return to mother earth.

(Mr. Kömives, Hungary)

13. Before concluding my statement, I should like to address myself to the co-Chairmen of our Committee -- Mr. Roshchin, the representative of the Soviet Union, and Mr. Leonard, the representative of the United States -- on the occasion of the resumption of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in Vienna today. I hope that those talks will make a great contribution to easing tension and to the limitation of the nuclear arms race. This could have a favourable impact on the activities of our Committee and also on the international situation as a whole.

14. Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Before reading my brief statement today, I should like, on behalf of the Czechoslovak people, to express deep admiration for the efforts of the American astronauts and scientists to bring Apollo 13 back to earth. We hope sincerely that all the efforts will succeed, and our best wishes go to the United States delegation.

15. The eyes of the world turn today to Vienna, which is the venue of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to welcome that important meeting and to offer best wishes for its success. The Czechoslovak delegation to the Committee on Disarmament had expressed its hope for the early inauguration of such talks long before the decision was taken to hold them. We welcomed with gratification the fact that preliminary talks were begun and that, as the participants agreed, they were started hopefully and were fruitful.

16. The idea of holding the talks resulted from realistic considerations derived from experience of the past upward trend in armaments. The spiral of military expenditure in the world has been a constant cause of general concern. At the present rate of growth it is doubled every fifteen years. According to the very interesting SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments, 1968/69, military expenditure on a world scale increased by almost 30 per cent in the previous three years. It has been rightly pointed out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) experts that when a weapon is modernized through research it is often assumed, with no direct evidence, that a potential enemy might have made the same discovery and that it is necessary to take the next step -- that is to proceed with the actual development of the weapon in question. Moreover, every new weapon is an encouragement for the development of a counter-weapon. Thus the development of new weapons seems to be ever more urgent.

(Mr. Vojvoda, Czechoslovakia)

As the SIPRI Yearbook informs us, the United States is spending $50 for research out of every $100 earmarked for military purposes. The situation is certainly much the same in other countries which try to maintain the balance in the level of armaments. In the absence of an international agreement there is little hope of a reversal of that process.

17. The purpose of these remarks is to underline the importance of the agreement sought in the Vienna talks, but also to point out the above facts, since we believe we should be constantly reminded of and mobilized against the growing budgets for military expenditure and that we should give constant warnings about that phenomenon. We have heard it stated here and elsewhere that good results from SALT may have a very favourable impact on the international situation in general as well as on the talks on other disarmament matters. It would be wrong, however, if in respect of SALT we adopted a wait-and-see attitude. In our view we in this Committee can encourage the participants in SALT by exerting maximum efforts to reach agreement on the items on our agenda.

18. On this occasion we should like to mention still another question. As is well known, SALT are closely connected with the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), and more specifically with article VI of that Treaty. We believe that although the Treaty has entered into force we should not relax our efforts to encourage other countries to ratify it. It is a cause of concern to world public opinion that many of the countries capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons have not even signed the Treaty yet. We read in the International Herald Tribune of 6 March 1970 that of those countries capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons only three have ratified the Treaty so far -- namely Canada, Sweden and the German Democratic Republic. We fully share the view that the number of countries which have ratified the Treaty and which fall within the category of what we call threshold States is much too small, although we have no intention of either supporting or refuting the information to the effect that among those States which have ratified the Treaty only three are capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Moreover, as this Committee has heard on several occasions, there exists a possibility of producing uranium-235 by the gas centrifuge method. When speaking before the Committee on 18 February 1970, the Secretary-General of the United Nations drew our attention to the possibility of a military application of the gas centrifuge method of producing enriched uranium, and he stated that he himself had become "concerned about the implications of this development" (CCD/PV.450, para. 19).

(Mr. Vojvoda, Czechoslovakia)

19. Early last March the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands signed an agreement on the production of uranium-235 by that method, and we hear that other countries may adhere to that agreement. Its main significance lies in the fact that it will make it possible to produce fissionable material without any dependence on the main suppliers so far -- that is the greatest nuclear Powers. Certain experts estimate that the power consumption for uranium-235 suitable for the nuclear weapon will be some 10 to 18 per cent of the power needed when using classical methods. We are assured by the parties to the agreement that it contains very specific and very strict guarantees against any form of military use. Nevertheless, we share the view of the representative of Nigeria who said at our meeting on 7 April that in view of the situation new ratifications of the non-proliferation Treaty seemed to be ever more urgent (CCD/PV.462, para. 74).

20. In Europe the Treaty has been ratified so far by fourteen countries, not including nuclear Powers, of which seven are countries of Eastern Europe. A number of European States potential producers of the nuclear weapon, including the Federal Republic of Germany, have not ratified the Treaty. Many countries are postponing ratification until the conclusion of the agreement on safeguards between EURATOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We hope that increased efforts will be exerted so that the agreement on safeguards may be concluded within the shortest possible time. Unfortunately, there are indications that the work on the IAEA safeguards treaty in Vienna has not started as smoothly as would be desirable. Moreover, as far as we know, Euratom has not submitted so far any formal proposals concerning its views on the safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Members of our Committee should help in every possible way, either in the IAEA or in Euratom, in the preparation of the safeguards treaty in the nearest future. We should like to urge those European countries which have not ratified the Treaty so far, to do so as soon as possible. Such an act would significantly promote European security and peaceful co-operation among European States.

21. In conclusion, may I once again express our best wishes for the success of the talks in Vienna, which will be transferred later to Helsinki, and greet the delegations of the two Powers opening the talks today.

22. Mr. BOZINOVIC (Yugoslavia): I would like to begin by joining you, Mr. Chairman, and the other delegations in expressing our best wishes for the safe return and safe landing of the brave astronauts of Apollo 13.

23. I would now like to extend a welcome to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Winiewicz, who is taking part at this stage in the work of our Committee, and also to Ambassador Vejvoda, of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and to offer them our best wishes for their complete success in the work of our Committee.

24. I would also like, before proceeding to the subject of my intervention, to mention that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) are beginning in Vienna today, and I avail myself of this fact to express the wish of the Yugoslav delegation for their complete success. I would add to that the sincere hope of the Yugoslav delegation that the two parties will find it possible to implement the appeal of the General Assembly to them:

> "... to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems." (resolution 2602 A (XXIV); CCD/275)

25. Last year Yugoslavia stated its position on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the question of the approach to the solution of that problem. Now the Committee is embarking upon a more detailed elaboration of this problem, and the Yugoslav delegation would like to express its views on some aspects which it considers important at this stage of our deliberations.

26. I would like to begin by expressing our appreciation to all the delegations which have already contributed to the clarification of certain aspects of this complex problem. We assume that the majority of countries have come to the conclusion that the present is a propitious moment for comprehensive consideration of the chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons complex with the aim of bringing about the speediest possible solution. Today I intend to deal in some detail with the question of control or verification, and to comment upon some of its aspects. But before I do so I should like to dwell briefly on some theses and arguments which have been brought up during this session and whose over-all effect has resulted in the overemphasizing of difficulties in achieving complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

27. At the beginning of our session our attention was called to the so-called realistic approach, which is aimed at the solution now of the problem of biological weapons only. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been repeatedly

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reminded of that. If we were to examine this "realism" more deeply we would have to admit that it would not stimulate the necessary progress. Another thesis concerns the alleged impossibility of banning chemical weapons completely now. Among arguments supporting this thesis one asserts that some countries consider chemical weapons important for their defence; another that some countries are already in possession of those weapons; a further one that some countries have programmes for them; and yet another that chemical weapons have been used in the past.

28. Such theses and arguments can hardly be sustained and we fear that their acceptance would lead to further negative conclusions. If one were to follow that logic one could, for instance, bring up the argument that if some countries consider chemical weapons important for their defence others may conclude that other weapons are of similar or even greater importance for their defence, so that they should not give them up. Further, should the possession of stocks of and the existence of production programmes for chemical weapons be a reason for not banning them, it might be concluded that no other weapons in existence should be considered for elimination. This would in fact mean that there could be no real disarmament. The same applies to the assertion that it is difficult to accept a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons because they have been used in the past.

29. Further, there is a tendency to divide chemical weapons into the so-called lethal and non-lethal ones, and also to differentiate between chemical and biological weapons, chemical weapons being regarded as tactical, battlefield weapons, and biological weapons as strategic weapons. Such divisions and differentiations are aimed, it would appear, at facilitating the proof that chemical weapons could not be prohibited completely, thereby ignoring the views expressed by the experts in the Secretary-General's report (A/7575/Rev.1). Divisions with such aims would appear to us to be dangerous. Relevant paragraphs from that report which state that chemical weapons designed only to incapacitate the enemy would be used in conjunction with other forms of attack so that the final effect might be lethal have already been quoted. Besides, the report of the WHO consultants, Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, states that:

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"No sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between lethal and incapacitating agents used in chemical and biological warfare, because incapacitating agents can be lethal or permanently disabling under certain circumstances ..."1/

And further:

"For similar reasons, no sharp demarcation line can be drawn between harassing agents and other anti-personnel chemical agents; furthermore, harassing agents may be used in war in conjunction with high-explosive, fragmentation or other weapons to increase the lethal effectiveness of the latter — as distinct from their employment in riot control in order to reduce injuries and to save lives."1/

This conclusion, as well as a similar one in the Secretary-General's report, has obviously been based on the experience acquired in military operations in the First World War, when these weapons were normally used by the major belligerent Powers, and also on later experience when they were used by a militarily superior Power against an unprotected adversary or one who could not retaliate in kind. Many representatives have spoken very convincingly in this Committee about the impossibility of accepting such theses, and generally speaking we share their views.

30. In connexion with the properties of some chemical agents I would like to comment briefly on working paper CCD/283, dated 16 March 1970, submitted by the delegation of the United States. The Yugoslav delegation appreciates this kind of working document in the conviction that it contributes to better understanding of the real conditions in which efforts are being made to achieve complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. However, I would like to say at the same time that from the data given in that document we do not draw the conclusion that it is not possible to prohibit chemical weapons. Nor do we conclude that we could not prohibit nuclear weapons because peaceful nuclear reactors can easily produce nuclear explosives. The production of phosgene and of mustard gas or organophosphorous pesticides, etc. used for peaceful purposes should not necessarily be discontinued. Modern chemistry and physics will probably continue to give us more and more such

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1/ Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons, p.12.

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products and mankind will not abandon them because they could be misused. It is the responsibility of the States to see precisely that this does not happen. One of its positive elements is that the chemical means mentioned in the United States working paper exist in various countries, so that the possibility of easy conversion in case of war applies to all of them, the result being a kind of mutual balance or neutralization.

31. I would like now to pass to the question of control or verification in connexion with the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. I do so with the desire to stimulate further the debate in the Committee as regards the complete prohibition of these weapons. This is not an attempt to formulate any proposal; what I would like to do now is to indicate in a preliminary way some elements which may be of interest when clarifying this problem. Before proceeding, I would particularly like to acknowledge the Swedish delegation's untiring efforts and concentration on very pertinent issues. We are greatly encouraged to find that our ideas seem to be very similar to those expressed by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her statement on 9 April (CCD/PV.463, para. 3 et seq.). I should also like to say that my delegation appreciates very much the efforts of the delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland in producing working paper CCD/285 of 14 April concerning the so-called complaints procedure, which was so ably presented at our last meeting by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Polish People's Republic, Mr. Winiewicz (CCD/PV.464, para. 4 et seq.) and the representative of Mongolia, Mr. Dugersuren (ibid., para. 39 et seq.).

32. The first question to be raised is, I believe, whether control or verification of the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons is necessary. We know that the answer to this question requires more elaboration, space and time. At this stage we will limit ourselves to drawing attention to only two relevant aspects in favour of control. First, intensive activity is required to lessen the high degree of mistrust which exists in the present-day world. One way of contributing to this is probably by ever greater openness, and therefore by some kind of control.

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The second aspect is that under present international conditions the non-existence of a certain degree of control might either render impossible the achievement of such an agreement or make it unstable, or perhaps burden it with constant suspicions leading to other negative steps.

33. I should like now to deal briefly with the question of whether it would be possible to establish control over the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons under present-day conditions, at the same time making the prohibition both purposeful and widely acceptable politically. In the view of my delegation such control should primarily meet the following requirements:

1. It should fulfil its intent -- in other words, be efficient to the point of not leaving open any possibilities for undetected violations of decisive importance.
2. It should not inflict commercial or other damage through the revealing of industrial, scientific and other secrets.
3. Its functioning should be relatively easy and simple.
4. Expenses for the control should be kept at the lowest possible level.

Those are, in our view, some of the basic requirements which should be observed when trying to establish a functional system of control over the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

34. In order to rationalize our efforts when studying the possibilities and conditions of control over chemical and biological weapons, we believe it to be very important to point out the fact that 100 per cent control over all institutions and installations which could be used for research, development, production and stockpiling is not possible. But at the same time we must also agree that 100 per cent control is not indispensable. The question then arises as to the degree of control, the kind of control and the points at which it would be necessary in order to achieve its end and at the same time be objectively acceptable to the majority of States.

35. There is yet another factor to be recognized a priori, namely, that there could be no rationally implemented control, as it appears, which would render impossible clandestine production and possession of such limited quantities of chemical and biological weapons as have no real military importance but which might be used for so-called terrorist purposes.

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36. In the event of our adopting those assumptions, which in our view should not present any particular difficulty, it would seem useful to start considering the possibility of establishing a system of measures -- and I should like to underline the word system -- the over-all results of which could represent a sufficient guarantee for each country signatory to such a treaty. I should like to put forward some possible elements of such a system of control. They could be sorted out into four groups or categories which I shall first enumerate and then comment upon in a preliminary way. They are as follows: first, legal measures of renunciation and self-control adopted by each country; second, measures of indirect control to be carried out by an international organ, or by each country individually, primarily on the basis of official statements and analyses of scientific and other relevant public information; third, measures of international control; and fourth, action in case of suspicion of violation or of open violation.

37. The first group of measures would, in our view, consist of the following.

(a) States should enact a law putting under civilian administration or civilian control -- the ministry of health, the ministry of industry or a similar body -- all institutions which are now engaged in research, development and production in the field of chemical and biological weapons. The Yugoslav delegation has already made that suggestion, in its statement of 10 March (CCD/PV.456, para.35). It might be asked whether such a measure would be possible and what its advantages were likely to be. We believe that such a measure is possible. Its introduction would in itself considerably lessen the possibilities for illegal production of chemical and biological weapons. The secret production of such weapons would normally be much easier in military installations, usually not accessible to the public. It should be clear that some of the present military institutions could be converted and could continue to function under civilian control in the field of scientific research for peaceful purposes or for passive protection, in conformity with the treaty regulating that matter.

(b) By another law States should prohibit research for weapons purposes and the development, production and stockpiling of agents for chemical and biological warfare; and they should also take a decision on the elimination of existing stocks and the abolition of testing fields for those weapons as well as all the installations serving the production of those weapons. In the enactment of such

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a law or laws and exception could be made in conformity with the international treaty on the general prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and for the continuation of work on measures for passive protection, and perhaps also an exception for the kind and quantity of agents used for riot-control purposes. The implementation of those laws should, we believe, be left to each signatory State to secure.

(c) The third measure within the scope of this group of measures would be to cease the training of armies in the use of chemical and biological weapons. Consequently all rules and regulations pertaining to the ways of using and conditions for use of chemical and biological weapons should be deleted from all military manuals.

We see this group of measures -- that is, measures of renunciation and self-control -- as being the most important and as the main deterrent to possible violations of the treaty.

38. I would now pass on to the second group of measures: measures of indirect control to be carried out by an international organ or by each country individually, primarily on the basis of official statements and analyses of scientific and other relevant public information. It is known -- and the latest report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute deals at length with this -- that a series of data in each country pertaining to the expenses in certain fields of activity, to the utilization of certain raw materials, semi-finished products and final products, to the development of scientific and research work, and so on, could indicate whether or not there was any activity contrary to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons being carried out. Obviously such a conclusion could be drawn only if the whole field of that activity were under civilian control, as stated in connexion with the first group of elements.

39. The third group of elements relates to measures of international control. It seems to us that several concrete measures might be introduced in order to increase the certainty of the non-existence of prohibited activities. At the same time all such measures should be in conformity with the basic requirements which I spoke of at the beginning of my statement, namely, the requirement not to be intrusive, and so on.

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

(a) One of the measures should be that once complete prohibition had been agreed upon governments should make public a list of all institutions, factories, proving grounds and the like which prior to the ban were engaged in research on, and development, production and testing of chemical and biological weapons, as well as a list of institutions which by their nature could be engaged in such activities.

(b) Governments should on their own initiative provide the possibility for appropriately regulated access to show, if need be, the non-existence of any forbidden activity. That would be the so-called verification by challenge which the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, has suggested (CCD/PV.463, para.18).

(c) Within this group of elements there exist, one should point out, possibilities for control from the air by satellites and other devices for remote detection. We hold that they are not sufficiently known and that it would be useful if countries possessing such technology and experience could agree to put forward their views on the subject.

40. I would now pass on to the fourth group of measures: action in case of suspicion of violation or of open violation -- the so-called complaints procedure. In the event of the existence of suspicion of violation or of open violation of the treaty prohibiting chemical and biological weapons, each State party to the treaty should inform other parties to the treaty. If suspicion only were in question, the States harbouring the suspicion could approach the control organ. Later, or at the same time, depending on the case and on the judgement of the countries concerned, they should address themselves to the Security Council. In order to facilitate preliminary investigation of a possible suspicion that a country was violating the treaty on the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, a separate international organ could be set up or the already existing organs or agencies could be utilized for those purposes. Should a country suspect that another party to the treaty was violating it, that State could then present the case, with the necessary data, to that organ. The control organ would then contact the government of the country under suspicion in order to make further preliminary investigations to see whether such suspicions were justified. Provision should be made for the control organ to communicate the results of its investigations to the Security Council. In relation to such a procedure there arises the question of how effectively the Security Council could deal with such complaints, bearing in mind the basic rule of the so-called veto. But that is a separate issue which I do not intend to deal with now.

(Mr. Božinović, Yugoslavia)

41. Finally I should like in particular to stress and again express our view that control in connexion with chemical and biological weapons is primarily of a political character. Whether the control would be acceptable, to what degree, of what kind it should be, how it would be implemented -- all that would depend above all on whether the political readiness for it existed. We believe that if such political readiness does exist the technical, legal and other problems will be capable of solution without special difficulty.

42. There are many facts which, in our view, reveal a widespread disposition in the world for the complete prohibition and elimination of all chemical and biological weapons and relatively favourable conditions for bringing that about now. The responsibilities of governments, in such conditions, are particularly great. It is up to them to benefit from such circumstances and to achieve the urgent and complete prohibition of all chemical and biological weapons, coupled with a meaningful and purposeful system of control.

43. Mr. DATCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): At the beginning of my statement today I should like to associate myself with you, Mr. Chairman, and with other delegations in addressing to the United States delegation the most sincere wishes of the Romanian delegation that the crew of spacecraft Apollo 13 may overcome the difficulties that it is facing in these dramatic moments. It is with deep emotion and great hope that we follow this extraordinary adventure and the skill of the astronauts. In expressing our deep admiration for the courage, the boldness and the sang-froid of the three men in space we wish them with all our hearts a safe return to earth.

44. I have pleasure in addressing, on behalf of the Romanian delegation, a welcome and best wishes for success to Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and Ambassador Benhima of Morocco, while assuring them of our co-operation in their work in this Committee.

45. At this stage of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Romanian delegation would like to put forward a number of considerations concerning the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. The presence of the complex of

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problems posed by chemical and bacteriological weapons on the agenda for disarmament negotiations and the thorough debates which have taken place in the Committee and at the United Nations give striking emphasis to the concern and the efforts of the international community to eliminate once and for all the unprecedented dangers which weapons of mass destruction represent for the life of all nations. On a wider plane, these efforts fit in quite naturally with the noble and constant efforts of mankind to put reason and justice at the foundation of relations between States and to exclude force and the instruments of force -- first and foremost those which are most destructive and most dangerous -- from international life.

46. The standards of contemporary international law, which have taken shape and become recognized after a long historical process throughout which mankind has paid a heavy price in material and human losses, brand as criminal and prohibit the use of any barbaric weapons, condemning such acts as particularly harmful and a threat to civilized values and the vital interests of the peoples. It is obvious that nuclear weapons, like chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, come within the province of these imperative standards. Indeed, owing to their gigantic capacity for destruction and their applicability on both the tactical and the strategic levels, the whole group of chemical and biological combat weapons is considered, from the military point of view, simultaneously with atomic weapons. Together they form the triad A B C of weapons of mass destruction, the so-called "special" weapons.

47. On the political, legal and moral levels, the questions posed by atomic, biological and chemical weapons are substantially the same; in their entirety they come under the group of standards forbidding the use of weapons of mass destruction as being contrary to international ethics and to the standards of law generally accepted by the international community.

48. Considering the great danger the world is facing because of the existence of nuclear weapons, Romania has always maintained and continues to maintain with the greatest determination that it is necessary to take energetic measures with a view to eliminating all means of mass destruction and averting the danger to mankind which they represent. Thus, as we had occasion to declare in our statement on 5 March

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(CCD/PV.455, para.55), the Romanian Government has consistently declared itself in favour of intensifying negotiations on nuclear disarmament, which should enjoy absolute priority within the framework of the negotiations. In this respect the greatest urgency attaches to measures concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, the discontinuance of underground tests of such weapons, the establishment of denuclearized zones together with appropriate guarantees, the cessation of production and, finally, the liquidation of stocks of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.

49. At the present stage, and more particularly following the entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*), which constitutes a legal obligation to conduct, in good faith, negotiations likely to lead to real measures of disarmament, there is no justification whatever for delaying negotiations on nuclear disarmament or for the tendency to avoid beginning concrete and effective discussions on this subject.

50. In arguing in favour of the negotiation and implementation of all measures likely to represent concrete steps towards disarmament -- among which we include the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons -- we reiterate our view as to the imperative need to examine in parallel with this and with full consciousness of our responsibilities and of the urgency of the problem, the questions of nuclear disarmament, and as to the absolute necessity to take up again without delay the negotiations on general disarmament, which constitute the mandate and indeed the raison d'être of our Committee. To evade or defer consideration of these major problems would be to make difficult and more complicated as time passed the solution which must be found for the burning problems of disarmament, and would have negative repercussions on the standing of the Committee in world public opinion.

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51. The Romanian delegation approaches the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons in the light of Romania's position of principle, according to which all weapons of mass destruction, without any exception whatsoever, must be outlawed and banned from the military arsenals of States.

> "It is high time" — Mr. Nicolae Ceaucescu, President of the Council of State of Romania, emphasized recently — "that all peoples, all governments, all politicians considered with the fullest sense of responsibility the danger which threatens our planet and acted with all possible determination to put an end to armaments and, first and foremost, to eliminate all nuclear, chemical and bacteriological armaments."

The achievement of this objective is of undeniable importance and urgency for the security of all nations and for gradual progress along the road leading to disarmament.

52. As has been pointed out by other delegations which have spoken already, at the present time, when the views of members of the Committee on the different aspects of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons are known, our task is still to continue and intensify the efforts aimed at widening the existing zone of agreement; to eliminate gradually and consistently, the controversial elements, so that we may translate the consensus thus achieved into the generally acceptable language of an international legal instrument.

53. The process towards the preparation of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is facilitated, in our view, by the existence of important documents, proposals and suggestions, which form a useful foundation for the development of negotiations based on a wealth of reference material. We have in mind the relevant resolutions on the matter adopted in recent years by the United Nations General Assembly, the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, as well as the full analysis of the problems of chemical and biological weapons which figures in such documents as the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575/Rev.1) of 1 July 1969, the report of a group of consultants of the World Health Organization entitled "Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons", the monograph by the experts of the

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Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) concerning the question of chemical and biological means of warfare[1], and the draft convention separately introduced by nine socialist countries (A/7655) and the United Kingdom (ENDC/255/Rev.1).

54. All these documents, as well as the views expressed both at the United Nations and in the Committee on this whole group of questions or on important technical elements thereof and the suggestions and proposals put forward by various delegations, trace the guide-lines for the agreement which it is our task to establish and throw into relief the principles, ideas and practical methods which must be considered carefully within the framework of the negotiations.

55. Now we should like to consider certain aspects and ideas in this wealth of reference material which seem to us important and useful for our work.

56. First, we wish to stress the necessity to start, when approaching the complex of problems of chemical and biological weapons, from the resolutions of the General Assembly which define the mandate to be fulfilled by the Committee on Disarmament. Thus, in the terms of resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966, the Committee:

> "... has the task of seeking an agreement on the cessation of the development and production of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and on the elimination of all such weapons from national arsenals, as called for in the draft proposals on general and complete disarmament now before the Conference" (ENDC/185).

Resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 spells out the mission of the Committee, requesting it to envisage urgently an agreement on this matter and to submit:

> "... a report on progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session" (CCD/275).

57. An aspect of quite special value, both on the plane of principle and on the practical plane, which we would like to emphasize, concerns the relationship between the agreement now in course of negotiation and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The discussions both in the Committee and in the United Nations reveal the existence of a

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broad consensus that the Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents, should be the starting point of any measure aiming at the elimination of weapons in this category. That is precisely why we fully share the opinion, supported by a large majority of States, that the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons ought to be considered as being solved by the Geneva Protocol. This interpretation is founded, at the same time, on the qualified conclusions formulated in the report prepared by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in which it is stated inter alia:

> "The momentum of the arms race would clearly decrease if the production of these weapons were effectively and unconditionally banned. Their use, which could cause an enormous loss of human life, has already been condemned and prohibited by international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol of 1925, and, more recently, in resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations." (A/7575/Rev.1, p.xi)

58. Romania, as a country which was among the first to sign the Protocol, considers that the treaty to be prepared prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons must in no way infringe or affect the validity of that important international instrument which has shown itself to be a political, legal and moral barrier to the use of these weapons. On the contrary, it must contribute to its consolidation and universal application. This could be achieved by the means indicated in resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of the General Assembly which:

> "... calls ... for strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol ..." and
>
> "Invites all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations;". (CCD/275)

59. As has already been emphasized -- and rightly -- by numerous delegations at the current session of the Committee as well as the majority of the States Members of the United Nations, the Geneva Protocol represents an international instrument of incontestable authority, constituting the cornerstone of international legality in this matter; throughout the forty-five years which have passed since its adoption it has withstood all erosion factors, and without that instrument it would be impossible to draw up the new instrument aiming at the de facto elimination of chemical and biological weapons.

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60. The unfailing observance and application of the Geneva Protocol are based, first and foremost, on the principle of the universal value of respect, in good faith, for international treaties and agreements -- pacta sunt servanda. At the same time, the maintenance and consolidation of that instrument stem directly from the sense of the progressive development of the heritage of the principles and standards of contemporary international law, which presupposes, logically and necessarily, that the existing regulations, the legal rules evolved and unanimously accepted, which have entered into the legal conscience of the peoples -- as is the case with the Geneva Protocol -- should be preserved and respected, and that efforts continually to enrich them and give them new value should continue.

61. Therefore, to bear in mind the premise of the validity of the Geneva Protocol is to respond to the major demands of principle which must necessarily be taken into account in negotiating the new instrument. This is, at the same time, a pragmatic way of approaching this question, because the Geneva Protocol is a solid juridical frame for the future treaty, the preparation of which it facilitates. If the norms of international law, and in the first place those defined and enshrined in the Geneva Protocol of 1925, condemn and prohibit recourse to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, the next step to be undertaken, logically and necessarily, is the adoption of a measure aimed at the physical elimination of weapons in that category.

62. The discussions in the United Nations, and in particular in this Committee, have revealed the existence of a broad current of opinion in favour of the prohibition of all weapons of this category and of the conclusion of a wide and complete agreement stipulating the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling, in equal measure, of both chemical means of warfare and bacteriological and biological means. Such an approach flows directly from a consideration of the particularly harmful effects of chemical, bacteriological and biological agents, as well as the combined treatment of these weapons as one in important international instruments such as the Geneva Protocol and resolutions of the United Nations.

63. In international law, as regards both the rules of war and the disarmament field -- as a well-known French jurist has said -- bacteriological weapons are closely linked with chemical weapons. This is so also in military practice and military theory. And it is also the case in the opinion of the public, where chemical and bacteriological weapons are united in the same image. This link is not founded solely upon general

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usage or an automatic association of ideas. It is based on powerful reasons of fact connected with the technical and military characteristics as well as the effects of these weapons. This relationship between chemical munitions and biological munitions has led certain authors to call chemical and biological weapons by the single term biochemical weapons.

64. In conformity with its consistent policy of demanding the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, Romania, a co-sponsor of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and on the destruction of such weapons, which was the result of the initiative of the socialist countries during the last session of the General Assembly and was recommended for examination by the Committee, is in favour of the adoption of measures prohibiting chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, as advocated in the document referred to.

65. The Romanian delegation is considering at the same time -- and with an open mind -- all other constructive proposals intended to contribute to achieving a wide measure of elimination of chemical and biological weapons. We are convinced that the controversial aspects, whether of principle or of a technical nature, in the preparation of this treaty will be satisfactorily resolved so that the Committee, thanks to the joint efforts aimed at establishing a generally acceptable agreement, will be able toconcentrate its attention upon other urgent problems which require solution. As has often been emphasized during the debates in this Committee, an important element of the measure prohibiting the group of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons is the setting up of an appropriate system of verification of the fulfilment of obligations assumed by the States parties to this agreement. For its part, the Romanian delegation, at a later stage in our work, will state its views on the control procedure for the treaty under study.

66. The Committee has before it several proposals and suggestions, among which we would like to mention those presented on 14 April (CCD/PV.464) by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Winiewicz, on behalf of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland (CCD/285), and those put forward by the delegations of Yugoslavia (CCD/PV.456, para. 36), Japan (ibid. para. 79) and Sweden (CCD/PV.463, para. 2 et seq), which merit examination with all due care with a view to finding an effective verification system which will have everyone's support.

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67. It is our deep conviction that the elimination for ever of these blind methods of warfare, of all weapons of mass destruction, is the only rational way of saving man from becoming the victim of his own scientific and technological evolution, senselessly controlled and directed.

68. Mr. LEONARD (United States of America): I would just like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the other speakers this morning for the good wishes which have been extended for the safe return of the crew of Apollo 13. I would also like to say that we appreciate very much the various offers of help in the rescue operations which have been made by a number of countries, including several which are represented here. The Government and the people of the United States are deeply grateful for both the sympathy and the practical assistance which have come from all parts of the world in these difficult moments.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 465th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Roberto Caracciolo, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the Chairman and by the representatives of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and the United States of America.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 21 April 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12 noon